No. 64

<Relativity of all experiential judgments to the circumstances of the experience. Relativity of all experienced to sensuousness>[[1]](#footnote-1)

<§1.> Relativity of all experiential judgments of worldly existence with relation to the causal dependencies belonging to the experiential sense

Each thing as thing of the experience is relative, it stands within an endless connection of relativity. Essentially each experience gives its real in an experiential sense going beyond that which has respectively been experienced in a proper way; the experiencing has always and necessarily an experiential horizon, and its sense being co-anticipated therein, being relatively determined and relatively undetermined is believed within the experiential believe as a [sense] to be verified, closer and possibly differently to be determined, within actual and possible further experience, but within a complete univocality preserving the experiencing being. However the sense- and being-horizon is further shaped within active experience, it is and remains necessarily an open-endless one. The open-endless multiplicity of things of actual and possible experience (as such) does belong to it.

The changeability and dependency of all changes of known and unknown real circumstances, i.e. of physical changes of the real horizon proceeding into the infinite unknown belongs to the necessary sense of everything being experienced as worldly that is [as] temporal. Hereby the unchanged is always valid (rest and any other unchange) as a limit-case of change. This dependency as belonging to the experiential sense, or rather, the respective, special dependencies, the real causalities, have their way of experience, or rather experienceability.

Every experience of the being-thus of something real is at first an experience of the being-thus in the moment of experiencing, and continuously within the duration of the experiencing, in which the moment of the physical duration giving itself therein, or rather the experienced piece of this duration itself according to its temporary quality correlatively itself, within the temporary change or unchange, shows itself.

Since also the **causal dependency** of this temporary change belongs to the experiential sense, it is given *a priori*, that no perceptual judgment, no immediate experiential truth which merely explicates that which respectively shows itself originally as physical being and has its grounding within this immediate experiential evidence, is irrelative or, which is the same, that each points us to an infinity (endlessness) of unexperienced, but experienceable causalities, by the knowledge of which the judgments belonging to the unexperienced determinations of the physical duration need to be co-determined. This also concerns the current experiencing, insofar as it is somehow meant beyond the moment <and the experienced is posited> as according to the experiencing being thus and thus remaining in peace or <within> an unchanged being of such a character. Every experiential meaning transcends the moment, every **experiential judgment** judges the being within the duration and as a unity of a change, and thereby beyond the content of the actually appearing side of the thing, and includes in the sense of this transcending meaning known and unknown causalities in open endlessness. That is simply why no experiential judgment is a closed, independent truth, final, and to be brought to final verification.[[2]](#footnote-2) The progress of the experiential cognizance can always extend the horizon in such a way that together with the surrounding things possibly entering the experience anew causalities do emerge, the cognizance of which by recourse forces the former experiences and experiential judgments to be changed according to their sense of acceptance, e.g. the opinion, that **[716]** the thing having been perceived has actually been unchanged not only according to the side having been experienced as unchanged, but also according to the unexperienced (legitimate at the state of the former experiential situation) properties having been anticipated as unchanged. The new causal experiential situation can ground a change, where formerly an unchange had been grounded, had been “co-experienced” in the way of original anticipation.

It is obvious that judgments from simple experience concerning objectivities being in their whole content dependent on experienceable determinations, can never be **objective truths**: We understand thereby truths which everyone and at any time there, where he likes to judge, could understand with exactly the same predicative significational content and [which he could] verify with insight together with this. The evidence which the pure experiential judgments could gain consists in its explicating that which has respectively been experienced into the actually and properly experienced properties and its judgingly determining with predicative concepts truthfully following them. But such an evidence and the truth given or designated rightfully within is a **changeable** one, it necessarily changes when the circumstances conditioning the experiential determinations are being changed. Each intellectually seen truth is conditioned by the experiencing subject cognizing his experienced object exactly in that moment, in the situation currently valid for him as being, where exactly it is relative as his currently being valid to this and not to those circumstances, the situational acceptances. Each presupposition conditioning <an experience>, under which the experience stands without the supposed truth having extended its predicative sense through introducing the conditions, is dependent as supposed truth, and is relative to a random moment of actual and possible insight, that is, to the subject of judgment in its judgment-situation. Should the judgment be able to become an objective one, and to initially be intellectually seen by one and the same judging subject in an unconditioned way, and thus all-temporarily, the **relativity of the circumstances** (relativity of the situational validity), would have to be included into the sense and the insight, that is, at all times. Above that it needs to be heeded that the deferring to the co-supposed circumstances in the first place leads again – and *in infinitum* **[717]** relatively to the circumstances – simply to infinities. It is thus evident that **physical experiential judgments as objective truths are inconceivable**. The more so if we add the demand that the intersubjective insight shall be guaranteed with insight for everyone and at any time. Experiential judgments can only have an objectivity which is limited and related to judging subjects being within a *de facto* united random community, namely if *de facto* within a time line the change of the circumstances is *de facto* irrelevant, unnoticeably changes the content of the experiential contents or insignificantly, and the experiential truths remain within the vague, and thus, as if the relativity kept itself within finiteness.

**Thus in advance relativity of the experiential givennesses and relativity of experiential truths are connected**: <on the one hand> the universal relativity of the objectivities experientially presenting themselves as being, and objective properties and on the other hand the relativity of the experiential truths - <relative> to the de facto experiencing and cognizing subjects and their temporary de facto cognizing. Relativity of all experiential givennesses with relation to the senses. The world is a sensuous world, also all subjects as realities being within the world through their organism are sensuously given, etc.

<§2.> Normality and abnormality of the sensuousness. The relativity of the sensuous experiential givennesses to the sensuousness

Relativism with relation to the random sensuousness of the αἶσθητα ἴδια in contrast to the αἶσθητα κοινά. These do not change randomly. Insofar and as long as there is a common nature for men at all, a communication happens, and can happen, a community of the κοινά exists. The intersubjective experience of a common surrounding world is itself presupposed in every experiential fact and as a fact. We communicate de facto and we have for practical purposes sufficient concordant experience, something being and being thus correlatively presenting itself.

The relativity as well, which the sophistic makes apparent, is a fact of intersubjective experience. That is: We find in contrast to the normal concordance of the experiences and experiential judgments – everyone for himself and again intersubjectively – abnormal deviances and in relation to normality and abnormality of the sensuous organs functioning in all experience, that is perception. But here the **qualities** differ which are given within the experience as physical thing qualities. As to the **primary** ones, the becoming abnormal of the senses and of the experiential judgments can be balanced through other senses remaining normal, insofar as these qualities are experientially not bound to a sense. Otherwise the **secondary** qualities being relative to the single senses, being ἴδια.

Here it is to be discerned: The human surrounding world experienced by intermediation of functions of human sensuousness, is thus presupposed as basic fact, that an experienced nature for the man is only there by his seeing with the eyes, his touching with tactual organs, etc., <that it> thus <stands> within a relativity to the human sensuous organism, thus this sensuousness must have a **normal character**, from which **abnormalities** radiate as possibilities. If human sensuousness is something changeable, that is in such a way that certain typical changes of the same bring along changes of experiential givennesses in the way of functioning (of the experienced things according to the content of experiential properties), then – if the possibility shall be kept at all, that within the process of single subjective and intersubjective experience a common and commonly to be legitimated world shall constantly be given – **an experienceable difference between normality and abnormality** must exist.

However the senses function for us men, and – as presupposed in relation to the experiential things as such – as perceptional organs, they have to function in such a way, that the experiencing subjects, everyone on his own, and commonly in mutual communication, identify the experiential things, are able to cognize them in the change of the properties being mutually perceived as the same, that is, in a cognizable experiential truth. Either thus, according to the circumstances this univocal truth never seems to be disturbed, then the senses of all experiencing subjects are exactly in **[719]** their functioning attuned to each other, namely in such a way, that simply all experience the same in completely compliant experiential properties. Or the accordance is disturbed, whereas continuously an identical world and in detail identical things are experienced in truth. The presupposed dependence of the experienced thing on the experiencing as in one a co-functioning of the senses <within the> progressing consciousness then is an empirical-de facto one, leaving open deviances as changes of the experienced, being different in different individuals and individual groups. But since still in truth, in consequent accordance the same things shall remain experienceable, and since the same cannot be experienceable without any content of experienced determinations being consistently experienceable and experienced, thus the respectively experienced properties must be distinguishable under all circumstances into unconditionally according ones, belonging to something normal and always remaining normal of the sensuousness (in primary properties), and into properties coinciding only randomly, and belonging to something to something “abnormal” of the sensuousness (secondary properties). **Normality** here means: All experiential givennesses have such a relation to sensuousness, that the sensuousness of all has a layer within the way of functioning, which “necessarily” is similarly functioning in all – necessarily, as long as an identical world shall be experienceable for it.[[3]](#footnote-3) **Abnormality** means that another layer within the sensuousness does not in the way of a norm stick to the sense of this necessity, but enables something individually changing within the otherwise generally same ways of functioning.[[4]](#footnote-4)

With this another, then possible difference of normality and abnormality crosses.[[5]](#footnote-5) If the experiencing subjects communicating with each other congruently experience in an **average** way – not only according to primary but to **all** properties – and shall be able to experience, so that the reigning consciousness of a world being determined according to all experiential properties and truly being shall be able to form itself, then the “normal” case (the indifferently fulfilled) must be, **[720]** that all senses of all experiencing subjects and according to the secondary one function in an according way also as according to the primary sensuousness, namely in correlation to the experiential contents. The abnormal is the deviance of this indifference, which thus can only proceed within the secondary sensuousness.

Meanwhile it needs to be considered, whether – if a regulated empirics exists in the relativity of experiential contents and senses in the way of a normal humanity in the second sense, to which single abnormal sensuous men can make an appearance – also sensuous abnormality is possible in the following way:[[6]](#footnote-6) Whereas there is always a normal sensuous humanity, single men can become abnormal in every regard, also in the primary one; and this can be valid for everyone, <for every> single one, if only a normal humanity always remains as community, to which he by the way, as soon as he again becomes normal, belongs. The single one can become abnormal with regard to the primary properties in such a way, that only single senses fail, but that other senses result in the same primary properties. Thus for them the properties are distinguished into primary ones as κοινά and in secondary ones as ἴδια. Or the single ones can at the same time become abnormal in all senses, and in all also regarding κοινά, and then lose all world experience. But there still is a normal humanity, and for it the normal world experience and the world being for it, and within this world the others are bodily there and with their abnormal senses, and can become healthy, then also know mediately, by the way of the others being now experienceable for them, that they have been abnormal, that in the meantime the world further existed, etc.

A being world is constantly experienced as a **common world** **of a constantly normal humanity**; constantly with relation to a functioning normal organism all worldly and also each organism is experienced, although again through bodily functioning. **This normal humanity is itself there for normal humanity**, and is there as keeping itself within the personal change, and so to say keeping itself as such an immortal one, and in correlation to this **the experienced univocal world as a normal** **[721] world**. During this invariance the variation of the deviances exists, of the becoming abnormal, in the form of the becoming abnormal of single persons, that is in a double way: with regard to single senses, but in such a way that these persons are still subjects of the world experience, just not of perfect [world experience], <rather> deviating from the normal in single properties, or <in such a way> that these persons stop being subjects of a world experience, that is, completely dropping out. This leads to a difference <between> relative sensuous abnormality and absolute sensuous abnormality of the single subjects.

But “normal humanity” cannot merely designate here: a sustaining [humanity], somehow in experiential judgments indifferently corresponding in general. Otherwise the change of the normal humanity into such a one of blind men would eventually mean the change into another normality. Hereto it needs to be said:

1) The relation of the normality to <something optimal> is missing, the relation of all perceptions to something correspondingly optimal.

2) Every property being experienced by me in univocal experience in truth belongs to my surrounding world, and thus to all communicating with me in a normal way. If then within someone’s sensuousness, that is, within his sense, a property is missing, it is as if a corresponding sensuous organ was missing, <as> if the property in its respective sensuousness was missing. It was still there, verifiably belonging to the surrounding world. “It needs to be constituted”, and then again it will be experienced.[[7]](#footnote-7) If it has a deviance, this is a deficiency. The normal at the same time is the “better”, richer in substance, which can also indicate more. This means: The kind of the actually constituted experiential world as a human one is thus that each property individually experienced in a univocal way (inserting itself into the completeness of the world experiences belonging to a personality) – even if it is abnormal, appears – shows an “objective true being”, and that the whole experience of all normal like abnormal implies an objectivity in all relativity. All abnormal as such exists within relations, which, if taken into account, together with the normal leads to something identical.

Appendix LVI

Inauthentic sense of relativity: Each and everything stands in relations. <Proper sense of relativity: A thing is only conceivable in relation to corresponding conditioning circumstances, the determination of which leads to an endless relativity.>[[8]](#footnote-8)

What is the sense of the general relativity of all things in pure experience?

In a certain sense **each and everything** being in whatever sense is always **relative**, everything has relative determinations and in relation to everything else. Namely everything can be thought and within thinking [can] be brought into relation to anything else; and now relations emerge in relation to truths. But this relativity is not meant now, if we say: Each sensuous thing is a πρός τι.

1) Each thing, purely considered as a **sensuous thing**, is relative. If it is experienced as red, as warm, as rough, all suchlike does not belong to it purely and simply. It is necessarily experienced within a further progressing connection of actual and possible experience, and all such determinations are due to it within this connection, with **relation to corresponding “circumstances**”.[[9]](#footnote-9) That to which it is related, is itself again, determined within experience, relative to further circumstances, and thus without an end. It is indifferent whether anyone knows of the circumstances being conditional for the respective physical determination “a”, whether he, experiencing the thing as being “a”, relates this being “a” to his circumstances, and as the determined ones, conditioning it, is indifferent. Since this holds true for all inner properties of a thing being experienceable within the experience, and belonging to each temporal layer, thus the thing with its whole concrete essence is **nothing for itself**, it has no own-essential being-for-itself, it is not, what it is, in itself, whatever else may be and how it may be, but always under circumstances. But it is not inconceivable that a thing with a lasting proper essence was independent, that it purely and simply was thus and thus, and that only the following experience made one suppose it was relative to circumstances. Rather, it shows itself that **a thing as such** **was only conceivable** **[723] in such relativity to conditioning circumstances**, but on the other hand [this shows] as well, that only the experience, be it at the respective thing itself, be it at similar ones within experiential connection, can bring out the typical and eventually quite individual circumstances belonging to the determined thing according to its kind and in an individually determined way.

Accordingly it is clear that **no experiential judgment** merely describing that which is given of a thing in actually experienceable intuition, and what it is itself according to its sense, **can in itself be true**, neither any judgment, which, reaching beyond this and the included experiential content, as relational judgment determines the thing as being thus according to corresponding circumstances. Because the determination of the circumstances leads in an endless relativity, into an infinity of ever new describing and relating judgments.

This is the one relativism being made valid by the sophistic and by the ancient skepticism deriving from it, being made valid simply in scientific-sceptical intend.

1. September 1926. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The evidence of experience and of the experiential judgment explicating it in a true way, is relative. This implies: It indeed is an evidence, but related to the whole experiential motivation of the moment, the experiential situation. Accordingly it is a conditional, a conditioned evidence depending on presuppositions, and thus the truth <of> relative validity. But this *in infinitum*. No judgment can ever gain a solid, irrelative, unconditioned truth from mere experience itself, however far it may be continued. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. 1) An unusual concept of normality. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. One can also speak of primary and secondary sensuousness. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. 2) Another concept of normality related to indifference. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. 3) Third concept of normality. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Eventually, as to the inconsistency, all actual appearances in the world have a real, psychophysical meaning. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Probably 1930. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. But what is implied in such explications? I obviously move within world apperception, within its horizonedness, within the explication of the apperceptive horizons in the form of “possible” perceptions, etc. But there one has to proceed radically and systematically. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)